Abstract-We consider the diffusion of innovation in twosided markets where both sides choose between an incumbent technology and an innovation. Each player chooses whether to adopt the innovation or not, and repeatedly learns how many players on the other side of the market adopted the innovation and revises her decision accordingly. Using largesystem analysis, we characterize the dynamics of the market, and show a phase transition result: If the initial proportion of adoptors on both sides are sufficiently large, then the innovation will spread to the entire market; otherwise, no one will adopt the innovation. Assuming the innovator can select the proportion of initial adoptors on both sides of the market by advertisements, we study the following three economic problems that are of interest to the innovator: 1) minimizing the advertisement cost while allowing the innovation to spread, 2) minimizing the total cost of advertising and technology improvement while allowing the innovation to spread, and 3) maximizing the total revenue less advertisement cost, where the innovator derives revenue per unit time from each player adopting the innovation. Our analysis provides insight into the types of advertising strategies that can lead to the successful adoption of an innovation.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the diffusion of innovation in two-sided markets. Specifically, we consider a market in which there are two types of players both of whom can choose one of two actions, denoted as the 'incumbent' and the 'innovation.' Only players of different types interact with each other, i.e., a type-1 player repeatedly learns the actions of all type-2 players, and then updates her action to maximize her payoff, and vice versa. This finds applications in the adoption of new technologies. As an example, floppy disks were once used by computer users as external storage, and computer producers included floppy disk drives in desktop computers to read and write data on floppy disks. When new storage media like compact discs (CD) were invented, computer users could switch to this new technology if more computers were equipped with CD drives, and vice versa. Diffusion of innovation can also be applied to public policy. As another example, electric cars have been introduced to the automobile market, which save gasoline and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Drivers can choose to buy either electric cars or conventional gasoline cars, and gas stations may invest in electric car charging booths. Drivers and stations prefer coordinating with each other. Subsidies can be used to bring both sides of the market to adopt electric cars. More examples can be found in [1] , [2] .
Diffusion of innovation through a network has received much attention in, e.g., [3] - [15] . Those references focus on models in which there is a single type of agent, each of whom makes adoption decisions based on her neighbors in an underlying network. This differs from the two-sided setting we are interested in, where there are two types of agents and decisions are driven by the adoptions of the opposite type. For a two-sided market, we use large-system analysis to characterize the dynamics of the market and show the following phase transition result: There is a continuum of threshold pairs such that, if the proportions of initial adopters on both sides are larger than some threshold pair, then the innovation will spread, otherwise the players will eventually give up the innovation. Also, there is a tradeoff between the thresholds for the proportions of initial adopters on both sides: If the threshold on one side increases, then the corresponding threshold on the other side decreases.
Diffusion of innovation is usually formulated as a graphical game [16] , where players are connected by a network, and their payoffs depend on the decisions of their neighbors, e.g., [5] - [14] . Our work is a special case of graphical games, where the underlying network is a complete bipartite graph. This is suitable when the identity of the players is immaterial.
An innovation does not spread simply because of its superiority over the incumbent, e.g., the Dvorak keyboard fails to replace the conventional QWERTY keyboard despite having a higher typing efficiency [17] . Therefore, selecting the initial state, or the proportion of initial adopters, is crucial. The initial state can be influenced by advertisements, which encourage players to adopt the innovation. Alternately, the innovator may subsidize players who adopt the innovation, or provide training to help players adopt the innovation. Here, we consider three related economic problems: 1) minimizing the advertisement cost while allowing the innovation to spread, 2) minimizing the total cost of advertising and technology improvement while allowing the innovation to spread, assuming the underlying technology can be improved, and 3) maximizing the total revenue less advertisement cost, where the innovator derives revenue from each player adopting the innovation. These problems are solved assuming linear or logarithmic costs. The solutions to these problems suggest advertising strategies for an innovator, i.e., whether advertisements should target players on only one side or both sides of the market, and how many initial adoptors the innovation should have. Our results indicate that sometimes it is the best to advertise on both sides, which contrasts with [1] , [2] where it is optimal to only advertise on one side.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related works. The system model is described in Section III. The condition on the initial state for the innovation to spread is discussed in Section IV. The economic problems stated above are discussed in Sections V, VI and VII, respectively. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Many existing works on diffusion of innovation assume that a coordination game with a risk-dominant strategy is played between homogeneous players. The case where players revise their decisions following noisy best-response dynamics was considered in [3] - [7] , i.e., players prefer their best response, but do not always follow it. Reference [3] showed that noisy best-response dynamics with global interaction result in every player choosing the risk-dominant strategy. Similar results were obtained in [5] , assuming players are located on a lattice, and they interact locally. It was shown in [6] that noisy best-response dynamics converge quickly for local interaction but extremely slowly for global interaction. Reference [7] characterized the expected waiting time until all players choose the risk-dominant strategy under noisy best-response dynamics on random graphs. When the degree of risk-dominance exceeds a threshold, the riskdominant strategy spreads under noisy best-response dynamics and gobal interaction, and the expected time for this to happen is bounded independently of the system size [4] .
Best-response dynamics were considered in [8] - [15] . In [8] , the condition for a strategy to spread from a finite group of population via best-response dynamics with local interaction was characterized. The expected number of adopters of the risk-dominant strategy was characterized in [13] . The results in [5] were extended in [9] to best-response dynamics. It is shown that, the state the system converges to critically depends on the initial state, and its convergence with global interaction is faster than that with local interaction, contrary to [6] . Mean-field approximation was used in [10] to show that for random networks, there exists a threshold for the degree of risk-dominance of a strategy, under which the strategy spreads. A similar approach was used in [11] to characterize the equilibria, and study their stability and their effect on diffusion, where players may incur some random cost when adopting a strategy. In [15] , different ways for diffusion to happen were discussed, assuming different players may adopt at a different rate. In [12] , compatibility between strategies was considered by allowing players to adopt both strategies with an additional cost. Reference [14] characterized the threshold for the degree of risk-dominance, under which the risk-dominant strategy spreads by letting a single player adopt it initially.
Some recent works consider dynamics on two-sided markets. In [18] , it is assumed that when a new player joins one side of the market, she adopts a strategy with a probability depending on the proportion of the players on the other side that has adopted the strategy, and the equilibrium of this dynamics is characterized. It is shown in [19] that the riskdominant strategy is stochastically stable under any noisy best-response dynamics in a two-sided market.
For diffusion of innovation with advertisements, this has been studied in a one-sided setting in [20] ; while in [1] and Type-2 +1 −1
[21], different models of price allocation for a monopoly and two competing products in a two-sided market are studied.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a large population of N type-1 players and αN type-2 players, where α > 0. Each player chooses one of two strategies: +1 (innovation) or −1 (incumbent). The system state is (p 1 , p 2 ), the proportions of type-1 and type-2 players choosing +1. Every player plays a game with each player of the opposite type. The payoff of the game is given in Table I . All type-1 and type-2 players have independent Poisson clocks that tick at a rate of λ 1 and λ 2 , respectively. When a clock ticks, the corresponding player best-responds by choosing the strategy that maximizes the sum of the payoffs of all the games she participates in. Assuming ties are broken in favor of +1, then +1 is the best response for a type-1 player if and only if
and the corresponding condition for a type-2 player is
Notice that conditions (1) and (2) are symmetric in the subscripts. Throughout this paper, when this situation arises, we will use subscripts a and b, and it should be understood as two expressions, one with a = 1, b = 2 and the other a = 2, b = 1. These conditions only depend on the payoffs through the differences w a − x a and y a − z a . Hence, in the following we will assume x a = z a = 0 without loss of generality, and the above conditions reduce to
Assume y a > 0 and w a > 0, so players prefer coordinating with each other. Strategy +1 is assumed to be risk-dominant, meaning that q 1 + q 2 < 1 [22] .
IV. EVOLUTION TRAJECTORY
Given the initial state (p 1 , p 2 ) and condition (3), which determines the best response, the following theorem characterizes the state at any time t ≥ 0 and shows a phase transition for the limiting state.
Theorem 1: Consider the large-system limit as N → ∞ while keeping α constant. If the initial state is (p 1 , p 2 ), then the system converges either to (1, 1) or (0, 0) with probability 1, and phase transition occurs along
The evolution of the state is given in Table II . 
Initial State
Trajectory
; and
if t > t
if t > t − a . (6) and (7) when a = 1,
Proof: Depending on whether (3) is satisfied or not, the state space is partitioned into four regions as in Fig. 1(a) .
Let the initial state be (
αN ), where n 1 and n 2 are the initial number of type-1 and type-2 players choosing +1. First assume that (p 1 , p 2 ) satisfies (3) for both types of players, i.e., the initial state is in region 1 in Fig. 1(a) . Then the best response for any player is +1, and the state can only change to
respectively. By Kurtz's Theorem (Theorem 2.1, Chapter 11 in [23] ), if we consider the largesystem limit as N → ∞ while keeping α constant, the evolution of the state is governed by the differential equations dp 1 
Solving these gives (5) . Similarly, if the initial state (p 1 , p 2 ) does not satisfy (3) for both types of players, i.e., the initial state is in region 4 in Fig. 1(a) , then we have (10) .
If the initial state satisfies (3) for only type-b players but not type-a players, i.e., the initial state is in region 2 in Fig. 1(a) if a = 1, or region 3 in Fig. 1(a) if a = 2 , then the corresponding differential equations are dp a (t) dt = −λ a p a (t), dp
Solving these gives p a (t) = p a e −λat and p b (t) = 1 − (1 − p b )e −λ b t , meaning that eventually either p b (t) = q b and the state enters region 1, or p a (t) = q a and the state enters region 4. The time t
and the state enters region 1, therefore we have (6) and (7). Otherwise, t − a < t + a , and the state enters region 4, hence we have (8) and (9) .
The result of Theorem 1 is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The phase transition boundary (4) is represented by dotted lines when a = 1, b = 2, and by dashed lines when a = 2, b = 1. The unshaded region, including the phase transition boundary, is the basin of attraction of (1, 1), i.e., if the initial state is inside this region, the system converges to (1, 1) with probability 1. The shaded region is the basin of attraction of (0, 0). If (0, 1) lies in the basin of attraction of (0, 0), this implies that even if all type-2 players initially choose the risk-dominant strategy +1, all of them will switch to −1 eventually. This is possible if type-2 players update more frequently than type-1 players, i.e., λ 1 and λ 2 have to satisfy
This is illustrated in Fig. 2(a) . Similarly, if (1, 0) lies in the basin of attraction of (0, 0), then type-1 players update more frequently and it is possible that even though initially all type-1 players choose the risk-dominant strategy +1, eventually they all switch to −1. This happens when
. This is illustrated in Fig. 2(c) . The remaining case where and (a)
, and (c)
(which is possible due to the risk-dominance assumption q 1 + q 2 < 1) is shown in Fig. 2(b) . Here type-1 and type-2 players update at similar rates. If all players of the same type initially choose the risk-dominant strategy +1, then eventually all players will choose +1.
V. COST MINIMIZATION WITH ADVERTISEMENT
It has been established in Section IV that for an innovation to spread, the initial proportion of adopters must be sufficiently large. Suppose the innovator advertises to encourage players to adopt the innovation, such that by spending C(p 1 , p 2 ), p 1 of type-1 players and p 2 of type-2 players adopt the innovation. Then the question is how the innovator should choose p 1 and p 2 so that the system will reach (1, 1) while the advertisement cost is minimized.
Assume that by spending C a on advertisements targeting type-a players, a proportion p a = F a (C a ) of type-a players switch to +1, where
. This additive cost model is appropriate if different types of players focus on different aspects of the innovation. Since F a (·) is increasing, F −1 a (·) is also increasing, and the minimizing state must lie on (4). The minimal advertisement cost is then given by the following optimization:
This can be solved by first transforming the problem into
, using the parametrization
and then followed by differentiation. Examples for linear and logarithmic costs are given below.
A. Linear Cost
Assume a linear advertisement cost 
:
, at
, at 0,
: . In a typical two-sided market, one side is treated as a profit center and the other side a loss leader, therefore advertisements only target the loss leader [1] , [2] . While sufficient advertisements targeting only one type of players allow the innovation to take over the market (see Fig. 2 ), Theorem 2 states that this is not always cost-efficient: Sometimes it is the best to advertise on both sides, except when λ = 1.
The evolution resulting from minimizing the advertisement cost is never monotone, i.e., either p 1 (t) or p 2 (t) has to decrease first and then increase to 1. If it is required that the evolution is monotone, meaning that we minimize γ 1 p 1 + γ 2 p 2 subject to p 1 ≥ q 1 and p 2 ≥ q 2 , obviously the minimum is attained at (q 1 , q 2 ). But (q 1 , q 2 ) never minimizes the advertisement cost if monotonicity is not required and the advertisement cost is linear. On the other hand, if the (p 1 , p 2 ) that minimizes the advertisement cost is chosen to be the initial state, the system will first evolve to (q 1 , q 2 ) (according to Theorem 1) and then to (1, 1) . This shows the tradeoff between advertisement cost and time: advertisement cost is reduced at the expense of spending more time to spread the innovation. As an example, suppose both types of players update once every year, the advertisement cost is 100 on either side, q 1 = 
1−e
−µaCa , so p a is concave in C a , and advertisements have diminishing returns. This cost model means that doubling the advertisement cost makes the same proportion of the remaining population switch to the innovation. So it is impossible to make all players of the same type switch to the innovation by advertisements only. In this case too, the solution to minimization problem (11) depends on λ 1 , λ 2 , µ 1 and µ 2 through the ratios (12)- (13), we obtain the following lemma. Table IV , where h 2 (·) in the table is the binary entropy function:
Based on Lemma 2, we arrive at the following strategy for logarithmic advertisement cost.
Theorem 3: The following advertising strategy minimizes the logarithmic advertisement cost: 1) Only target type-1 players if λ ≤ ln q1
and C 2 min ≤ C 1 min ; 3) Otherwise, target both type-1 and type-2 players. Theorem 3 again states that advertisements targeting only one type of players are not always cost-efficient.
VI. ADVERTISEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENT
In addition to choosing the initial state, suppose the innovator also wants to determine y 1 and y 2 , i.e., how much it should improve over the incumbent. Assume that the innovator spends C a to improve for type-a players so that
where G a (·) is increasing. Then the total cost of technology improvement and advertising is C = C 1 +
To minimize the total cost, the innovator has to solve the following minimization problem:
Therefore, minimizing the total cost is nontrivial since a reduction in the cost of technology improvement results in an increase in the values of q 1 and q 2 , which leads to an increase in the advertisement cost.
Assume y a = G a (C a ) = w a +β a C a , where β a > 0, and a linear advertisement cost as in Section V-A. The total cost is C = γ 1 p 1 +γ 2 p 2 + , then to minimize the total cost, y a and y b should be chosen such that q a and q b satisfy
and the initial state is p *
Proof: Notice that minimization problem (11) can be considered as a subproblem of minimization problem (14) .
Given λ 1 = λ 2 = 1 and γ 1 = γ 2 = 1, from Lemma 1,
The minimum total cost can be obtained by solving
The minimum can be obtained by setting the derivatives of the objective function with respect to q a and q b to zero. Therefore we get (15) and (16), and hence
is strictly decreasing in q b and its minimum is 2, therefore
Hence, q a and q b obtained from solving (15) and (16) satisfy all constraints in minimization problem (17) and solve (17) .
VII. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION Assume the innovator obtains a revenue of r a per unit time from each type-a player who adopts the innovation. Assume the innovator discounts future revenue at a rate of θ to account for depreciation. Then, the total discounted revenue is
where (p 1 (t), p 2 (t)) is the state at time t if the initial state is (p 1 , p 2 ). Assume a linear advertisement cost C(p 1 , p 2 ) = γ 1 p 1 +γ 2 p 2 as in Section V-A. The net profit of the innovator is the total discounted revenue less advertisement cost:
How should the innovator choose p 1 and p 2 so that its net profit is maximized? Here we do not require the initial state to be inside the basin of attraction of (1, 1), so the innovator only takes over the market if it is profitable to do so. By substituting p 1 (t) and p 2 (t) given in Theorem 1 into (18), we obtain the total discounted revenue as follows.
Lemma 3: If the initial state is (p 1 , p 2 ), the total discounted revenue is given by 1) in the case of p 1 ≥ q 1 and p 2 ≥ q 2 :
2) in the case of p a ≥ q a and p b < q b : a) if
3) in the case of p 1 < q 1 and p 2 < q 2 :
The total discounted revenue is not continuous because of the phase transition described in Theorem 1. Also, the total discounted revenue can be regarded as a sum of three terms, the first only depends on p 1 , the second only depends on p 2 , and the remaining one is a constant. Therefore, the net profit also has these properties, and can be maximized by considering p 1 and p 2 separately. The following result is obtained based on these observations. Theorem 5: The initial state maximizing the net profit is given as follows:
1) in the case of , and (c) . Evolution from any initial state on dash-dotted line or in the shaded area reaches (1, 1) , while evolution from any initial state on solid line or dot reaches (0, 0). Theorem 5 states four possibilities when the maximum net profit is attained.
1) If the maximizing state is (0, 0) (when r1 λ1+θ < γ 1 and r2 λ2+θ < γ 2 ), the innovator should not enter the market. 2) If the maximizing state is (p 1 , 0) or (0, p 2 ) in the basin of attraction of (0, 0) (when r1 λ1+θ < γ 1 and r2 λ2+θ < γ 2 ), the innovator should enter the market, but should not take over the market. 3) If the maximizing state is (1, 1) (when r1 λ1+θ ≥ γ 1 and r2 λ2+θ ≥ γ 2 ), the innovator needs advertisements only to take over the market. 4) Otherwise, the innovator needs both advertisements and interaction between players to take over the market. Fig. 3 illustrates all possible profit-maximizing states.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have considered diffusion of innovation in two-sided markets. Conditions on the initial state for the innovation to spread to the entire market have been obtained. We also solved three related optimization problems when the innovator can devote some resources to advertising and technology improvement. The solutions provide guidelines on selecting the initial state. ACKNOWLEDGMENT D. Guo would like to thank Dr. D. Liao of YourMechanic.com for the stimulating discussion which motivated this work.
